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PROSTITUTION IN NEW ZEALAND: THE RE-IMPORTATION OF 




In 2003 New Zealand became the only country in the world to decriminalise all aspects of 
unforced prostitution. The law reform heralded a radical shift; rather than attempting to 
suppress the industry by criminalising the participants, the purpose of the Prostitution Reform 
Act was to ensure that the human rights of prostitutes were safeguarded. But this contentious 
social experiment has only served to highlight an acute clash between the ideals of public 
participation in decision-making and the imperative of protecting the rights of an unpopular 
minority.  This article considers this dichotomy. By those most fusty stalwarts of local 
democracy, bylaws and planning controls, moral disapprobation has been allowed to continue 
to dominate, suppressing the rights of prostitutes.  Further, owing to the discretionary 
elements inherent in judicial review, administrative law has failed to provide the necessary 
safeguards. This article responds to Emily Van der Meulen and Elya M.Durisin and serves to 
caution rights-focused reformists; to be truly effective, any rights-based legislation should be 
careful in ensuring that the possible continuing moral indignation of local communities is not, 
through legal processes, permitted to threaten the welfare and safety of prostitutes and risk 




In 2003 New Zealand became the only country in the world to decriminalise all aspects of 
unforced prostitution with the Prostitution Reform Act (‘PRA’). Underpinning the law reform 
was an approach that would promote the well-being of prostitutes and ensure their labour and 
human rights.1 Indeed, the stated purpose of the PRA is, 
 
… to decriminalise prostitution (whilst not endorsing or morally sanctioning 
prostitution or its use) and to create a framework that – (a) safeguards the human 
rights of sex workers and protects them from exploitation: (b) promotes the welfare 
and occupational health and safety of sex workers.2 
 
Because of the controversy surrounding the legislation, a governmental review process was 
established to assess its impact and in 2008 the Prostitution Law Review Committee 
(‘PLRC’) released its first report.3 Key findings included that the legislation has had little 
impact on the numbers working in the industry4 and a marked effect on supporting prostitutes 
in refusing particular clients and practices.5 The PRA has undoubtedly improved conditions 
                                                 
1 New Zealand Parliamentary Debates (hereinafter Debates), vol. 606, (19 February 2003) 3607-3609 Tim 
Barnett (NZ Labour) and 3609–3610 Katherine Rich (National). Note we use the word ‘prostitute’ in this article 
rather than ‘sex-worker’ because New Zealand legislation refers to ‘prostitute.’ 
2 Prostitution Reform Act 2003 no 28 (Public Act) (NZ) (hereinafter PRA) s. 3; s. 4(1) prostitution is ‘the 
provision of commercial sexual services’; commercial sexual services include ‘physical participation in sexual 
acts for the gratification of another person which are provided for payment or other reward.’ 
3 Ministry of Justice Report of the Prostitution Law Review Committee on the Operation of the Prostitution 
Reform Act 2003 (New Zealand Government, Wellington 2008) (hereinafter PLRC). 
4 Ibid. at 41. 
5 Ibid. at 47. 
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for many prostitutes and has been widely lauded as a success.6 In their article “Why 
Decriminalize? How Canada’s Municipal and Federal Regulations Increase Sex Workers’ 
Vulnerability,”7 Emily van der Meulen and Elya M. Durisin argue persuasively for the reform 
of laws regulating prostitution in Canada and, in suggesting an alternate approach, they point 
to New Zealand as providing an exemplary model.  Certainly there are natural legal, political 
and social synergies between New Zealand and Canada that justify Canadian reformists 
considering the law reform in New Zealand, but it is important for international observers to 
closely consider the scenario in New Zealand to learn from some of the difficulties that have 
emerged.  In particular, van der Meulen and Durisin are impressed that New Zealand places 
“sex workers’ rights at the centre” of regulatory frameworks8 but in practice questions remain 
as to whether the New Zealand reforms are working adequately to promote the human rights, 
safety and well-being of prostitutes. 
This article considers the law governing prostitution in New Zealand and it highlights 
an interesting dichotomy. Since the early 1980s, New Zealand has attempted to refine and 
perfect the democratic process; in particular, government at all levels is structured to promote 
the participation of the public in decision-making.9 This approach, however, creates a tension 
between the Government in wishing to protect the rights of an unpopular minority and the 
general public, and importantly, as the case of prostitution demonstrates, it is a conflict that 
can seldom be won by a marginalised group that is truly disadvantaged.  
Critically, the participation of the public during parliamentary scrutiny of the PRA 
had an important influence upon the final form taken by the legislation, securing the right of 
local government to regulate the location of brothels via the making of bylaws and town 
planning controls. Existing laws ensure that local authority regulation is informed by 
submissions from the public. In many districts, this participation has enabled a backlash 
against decriminalisation and the reassertion of legal moralism in the control of prostitution. 
In practical terms brothels have been heavily regulated and pushed into marginal areas 
primarily because public submitters are opposed to prostitution per se. The ramifications of 
this are serious as such an approach has the potential to undermine the welfare and safety of 
prostitutes, and it risks the continuation of a clandestine, second-tier industry. Prostitution has 
been decriminalised in New Zealand but the continuing participation of the public at large in 
decision-making is operating to counteract the purpose of the PRA.    
In order to analyse the legal structures that have permitted moral disapprobation to 
dominate, this article is divided into three subsequent parts. In the first part we will explain 
the background to and some of the main components of the PRA, including the explicit and 
additional powers granted to local government. The judicial review of bylaws is addressed in 
part two; specifically, the difficulty faced by the courts in achieving the correct degree of 
intervention in cases that concern a clash between the rights of prostitutes and decisions 
                                                 
6 Gillian Abel (et al.) (eds.), Taking the Crime out of Sex Work – New Zealand Sex Workers’ Fight for 
Decriminalisation (The Policy Press, Bristol 2010) at 260; Vanessa E. Munro and Marina Della Giusta (eds.) 
Demanding Sex: Critical Reflections on the Regulation of Prostitution (Ashgate, Hampshire, U.K. 2008) at 57; 
Deborah R. Brock, Making Work, Making Trouble The Social Regulation of Sexual Labour (2nd edn, University 
of Toronoto Press, Toronto Buffalo London, 2009) at 165. Note however that Brock warns against “local 
legalization strategies that will undermine the overall gaols of decriminalzation” at 166.  
7 Emily van der Meulen and Elya M. Durisin, “Why Decriminalize? How Canada’s Municipal and Federal 
Regulations Increase Sex Workers Vulnerability” (2008) 20 Canadian Journal of Women and the Law 289-311 
at 307-310.  
8 Ibid. at 290. 
9 For example by providing for public access to information held by government, citizen’s initiated referenda, 
proportional representation in Parliament, and public participation in resource management and town planning. 
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based on community preferences. In part three, the role in restricting prostitution played by 
the Resource Management Act 1991, New Zealand’s main environmental and planning law 
statute, is considered.  
This article contains lessons for other nations presently debating decriminalisation 
and in particular, demonstrates the difficulties that may flow if local authorities are permitted 
to implement specialised rules expressly directed at regulating prostitution. Within Canada, 
the Pivot Legal Society has identified that zoning is “one of the more controversial issues in 
the national discussion” concerning decriminalisation, and that it is difficult to assess whether 
prostitution should be subject to specialised zoning rules.10 We conclude that within the New 
Zealand context local authorities should not be able to isolate prostitution and regulate it in a 
wholly different manner to any other business activity. In particular, we argue that while 
genuine nuisance effects from any business should be managed, the mere moral 
disapprobation of the public should have no place in regulating a legal industry at local 
authority level and this should be carefully guarded against. Ultimately, we contend that the 
New Zealand law reform of prostitution has been disingenuous. When the stated aim of the 
Government is to protect the rights of a disadvantaged group, to then allow moral 
majoritarianism at local community level to affect that minority and to undermine those 
rights, is perverse law making.  
 
2. Compromising to Obtain Agreement: The Enactment of the PRA 2003 
 
The approach taken to prostitution in New Zealand prior to the law reform of 2003 was 
“typical of that taken in most comparable jurisdictions … in that it sought to regulate the 
industry, but did so by penalising the worker.”11 Although the actual provision of sexual 
services for payment was not itself an offence, brothel keeping, living on the earnings of 
prostitution and soliciting were.12 
In 1999, the New Zealand Prostitutes’ Collective and other advocates for reform 
drafted the Prostitution Reform Bill that ultimately was adopted as a private members bill. 
Parliamentary debates on the Bill provided the setting for a stark clash between rights 
advocates and those concerned with preserving the traditional values of communities. 
Supporters argued that the Bill made “no moral judgment about prostitution”13 but rather 
aimed to give prostitutes the “same rights as any other New Zealander,”14 “justice, safety, and 
dignity” by decriminalising prostitution.15 Post-decriminalisation, prostitutes were to be 
subject to the same regulatory regimes as all other workers. Reformists argued that if the Bill 
were enacted it would reduce exploitation in the industry, prostitutes’ “work environments 
will improve [and] they will be less constrained in forming collectives, or similar worker-run 
businesses.”16 The Bill’s opponents, on the other hand, emphasised moral concerns, with one 
                                                 
10 Pivot Legal Society, Beyond Decriminalization: Sex Work, Human Rights and a New Framework for Law 
Reform (Vancouver, B.C., June 2006) at 65-77. 
11 PLRC above note 3 at 21. 
12 Crimes Act 1961 no 43 (Public Act)(NZ) ss. 147–149; Summary Offences Act 1981 no 113 (Public Act) (NZ) 
s. 26. 
13 Debates vol. 609, 6162 (11 June 2003) Tim Barnett (sponsor). 
14 Debates above note 1 at 3609. 
15 Debates above note 13 at 6159 Lynne Pillay. 
16 Ibid. at 6162. 
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Member of Parliament describing it as “an abomination against society [that] is against the 
sound social fabric of families.”17 
The legislation draws a distinction between forced or underage prostitution and 
unforced prostitution,18 subjecting the former to the full weight of the criminal law whilst 
decriminalising all aspects of the latter.19 In attempting to promote the welfare of prostitutes, 
the PRA extends health and safety legislation to brothels; imposes obligations in relation to 
safer sex practices on all participants;20 and ensures the eligibility of prostitutes to obtain 
state benefits if they leave the industry.21 In order to ensure that brothels22 are being managed 
appropriately, businesses employing five or more prostitutes must be certified and 
certification can be cancelled for operators who have specified criminal convictions.23 Small 
owner operated brothels (‘SOOBs’), where four or fewer prostitutes work, are exempt from 
the certification scheme.24 There are no requirements for individual prostitutes to register 
with authorities or to undergo medical tests. Finally, the PLRC was established and required 
to conduct a major review within five years of enactment, assessing the impact of the 
reforms.25 
When the Bill was first introduced to Parliament, it made no mention of the role of 
local government in regulating prostitution. However, important changes were made 
following the Select Committee process. A distinctive feature of New Zealand’s 
parliamentary system is that all bills are scrutinised by a Select Committee that invites and 
considers submissions from the public and then recommends changes to Parliament.26 
Unsurprisingly, opposition to the Bill was both organised and vocal and whilst the primary 
concern of opponents was for the Bill to fail, a fall-back position would see the introduction 
of explicit powers that would enable local authorities to control the location of brothels via 
bylaws and planning mechanisms. 
Clearly, such powers would import an element of caution into the reforms; local 
communities would be able to prevent prostitution from taking place in certain areas.  
However, the majority of the Select Committee did not endorse this suggestion, considering 
rather that existing criminal and planning laws were sufficient to address any tangible adverse 
effects flowing from prostitution.27 To grant additional powers to local authorities, the Select 
Committee opined, would run the risk of creating serious local conflict and drive the industry 
“underground.”28 Despite this view, the Hon Phil Goff introduced the amendments29 that, 
accepted in their entirety, became sections 14 and 15 of the PRA: 
                                                 
17 Ibid. at 6160 Bill Gudgeon. 
18 PRA ss. 16, 17, 20–22. 
19 PRA s. 7. 
20 PRA ss. 8–10. 
21 PRA ss. 17-18. 
22 PRA s. 2: brothels are ‘any premises kept or habitually used for the purposes of prostitution.’ 
23 PRA s. 36: this discounts previous convictions for living off the earnings of prostitutes; ‘pimps’ can now 
become legal ‘managers.’ 
24 PRA s. 34(3); s. 2 SOOBs are brothels ‘at which not more than 4 sex workers work’ and ‘where each of those 
sex workers retains control over his or her individual earnings.’ 
25 PRA ss. 42–46; committee includes a cross-section of society. 
26 Geoffrey Palmer and Matthew Palmer Bridled Power: New Zealand’s Constitution and Government (4th edn 
OUP Melbourne 2004) at 170. 
27 Justice and Electoral Select Committee, Prostitution Reform Bill (29 November 2002) at 15. 
28 Ibid. at 32. Note, this was the reason why decriminalisation was favoured over legalisation, see Munro, above 
note 6 at 3. 
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S. 14 Bylaws regulating location of brothels 
Without limiting section 145 of the Local Government Act 2002, a territorial 
authority may make bylaws for its district under section 146 of that Act for the 
purpose of regulating the location of brothels. 
 
S. 15 Resource consents in relation to business of prostitution 
(1) When considering an application for a resource consent under the Resource 
Management Act 1991 for a land use relating to a business of prostitution, a territorial 
authority must have regard to whether the business of prostitution – 
(a) is likely to cause a nuisance or serious offence to ordinary members of the public 
using the area in which the land is situated: or 
(b) is incompatible with the existing character or uses of the area in which the land is 
situated. 
 
In granting additional powers to local authorities to regulate the location of brothels, the 
legislature would secure the continuing involvement of the public in the control of 
prostitution. The statutory purpose of local government is “to enable democratic local 
decision making…and to promote the social, economic, environmental, and cultural well-
being of communities”30 and in order to ascertain how best to promote the well-being of 
communities, public participation is essential. When making regulatory bylaws, local 
authorities must follow the special consultative process31 set down in the general empowering 
legislation of the Local Government Act 2002 and in parallel, the Resource Management Act 
1991 establishes comprehensive procedures to promote public participation in planning 
decisions.32 
There can be little doubt that these changes made the Bill more attractive to 
parliamentarians;33 it was passed into law following a conscience vote, albeit by the 
narrowest of margins (there were sixty votes supporting the bill and fifty-nine against, with 
one Member abstaining). Following the enactment of the PRA, and in consultation with their 
communities, many local authorities moved to regulate the location of brothels by 
introducing bylaws or planning controls. In most instances, local authorities adopted a 
restrictive approach by excluding brothels, including SOOBs, from residential zones 
altogether and only opening to them limited parts of commercial or industrial areas in which 
to conduct business.34 The ramifications of this particular approach are significant because in 
                                                                                                                                                       
29 Debates above note 1 at 3619 Hon. Phil Goff (Minister of Justice); Supplementary Order Paper 2003 (70) 
Prostitution Reform Bill 2000 (2002 66-2). PRA s. 12 also introduced powers for local authorities to prohibit 
signage advertising brothels. 
30 Local Government Act 2002 no 84 (Public Act) (NZ) (hereinafter LGA) s. 10. 
31 LGA ss. 83, 86, and 155–157 requiring the publication of the proposed bylaw and explanatory report, public 
submissions and a hearing. 
32 Resource Management Act 1991 no 69 (Public Act) (NZ) (hereinafter RMA). In the case of plan-making and 
individual applications for resource consents granting dispensation from plan rules, the RMA requires: 
environmental impact assessments (ss. 32, 88); public notification and consultation (usually) (ss. 95A–95C, 
Schedule 1); submissions and hearings (ss. 96–100, Schedule 1). 
33 Debates above note 1. 
34 PLRC above note 3 at 137-138. The PLRC reports that out of 73 authorities, 43 expressly considered 
prostitution in their district post PRA; 15 decided their district plan was sufficient; 6 changed the plan; 15 
promulgated a new bylaw or amended an existing bylaw; 13 of those bylaws controlled the location of brothels; 
12 defined specific areas within which brothels are permitted to operate, all being commercial and industrial 
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contrast to many other occupations, the work environment in which prostitutes operate 
directly influences their well-being and safety. 
Research shows that street-based prostitutes are at the greatest risk of violence and 
abuse.35 Rights-focused reformers argue that the restrictive approach taken by many local 
authorities in banning SOOBs from residential zones appears to have forced more prostitutes 
onto the streets;36 hardly what the legislature intended in passing the PRA. Prostitutes that do 
work indoors may meet a client at an arranged venue or work “in-call” (i.e. in a SOOB or 
managed commercial brothel). Prostitutes who work in SOOBs have much greater freedom to 
refuse particular clients or practices37 but forcing SOOBs into less populated industrial or 
commercial zones places prostitutes “at greater risk of violence and/or robbery, as they may 
not have the security arrangements that a larger brothel has.”38 In practice, major economic 
barriers, such as high rentals, prevent individual prostitutes or those working with one or two 
colleagues from establishing their businesses in commercial zones. Such barriers favour 
larger brothels run by businesses, whereby others control the prostitutes’ labour and income. 
The New Zealand Prostitutes Collective assert that many prostitutes choose to operate from 
SOOBs precisely because this avoids the risk of exploitation and abuse, particularly financial 
abuse, from such ‘managers.’39 One such form of abuse occurs with ‘bonding’, whereby 
managers withhold a sum of money from the prostitutes in order to secure their attendance at 
work. The bond will be forfeited for lateness or non-attendance.  Bonding is a persistent 
problem in New Zealand despite decriminalisation.40  
SOOBs have other advantages over large, commercial operations. 41  Research 
highlights the importance of the worker being able to communicate directly with the client 
before the transaction.42 When a third party intervenes, misunderstandings are more likely; 
workers may be placed under pressure to provide services that they are not comfortable with 
and this can cause tension if they refuse to comply. Further, large businesses tend to be less 
discreet in advertising their services than SOOBs and concerns have been expressed that this 
fact alone diminishes workers’ prospects for privacy and potentially their ability to exit the 
                                                                                                                                                       
zones. Updated figures obtained by the authors show that 19 bylaws are in place with a further one in 
development and 5 district plans specifically address zoning for prostitution; a clear preponderance of public 
submitters cite moral and religious reasons for opposing prostitution in their neighbourhoods, see Ceri Warnock, 
“Prostitution in New Zealand: Have the reforms failed?” forthcoming 2012 (on file with authors). 
35 Abel above note 6 at 10; PLRC above note 3 at 55-56; Tamara O’Doherty, “Criminalization and Off-Street 
Sex Work in Canada” (2011) 53 Canadian Journal of Criminology and Criminal Justice 217-245 at 218 
(referring to the plethora of research undertaken on this issue). 
36 Debates vol. 628, 651 (8 September 2010), Hon George Hawkins describing the ‘plague’ of street prostitution 
in Manukau City, alleged by Sue Bradford MP to be caused by the restrictive approach taken by the Council to 
SOOBs at 666. 
37 Gillian Abel and Lisa Fitzgerald “Risk and Risk Management in Sex Work Post-Prostitution Reform Act” in 
Abel above note 6 at 224; PLRC above note 3 at 46-47; van der Meulen above note 7 at 308.  
38 PLRC above note 3 at 139; Pivot Legal Society above note 10 at 75. 
39 Evidence of Catherine Healy in Conley v. Hamilton City Council unreported, H.C. Hamilton, CIV-2005-419-
001689, 19 July 2006 [66]–[68] (hereinafter Conley (H.C.)); Tim Barnett (et al.) “Lobbying for 
Decriminalisation” in Abel above note 6 at 70; evidence of A. M. Reed in Willowford Family Trust v. 
Christchurch City Council [2011] N.Z.A.R. 209 [26] (hereinafter Willowford). 
40 Elaine Mossman “Brothel operators’ and support agencies’ experiences of decriminalisation” in Abel above 
note 6 at 129-130.  
41 Leslie Ann Jeffrey and Gayle MacDonald ““Its’s the Money, Honey”: The Economy of Sex Work in the 
Maritimes” (2006) 43 Canadian Review of Sociology / Revue Canadienne de Sociologie 313-327 at 323-325. 
42 O’Doherty above note 35 at 224-5. 
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industry with ease.43 There are obviously advantages and disadvantages inherent with each 
sector of the business, but there is clear evidence that giving workers the choice to operate 
from SOOBs, a form of brothel that is usually found in residential areas, facilitates the safety 
and well-being of its workers.  
In the Canadian context, in a recent decision of the Ontario Superior Court of 
Justice,44 Himel J. found, on the voluminous evidence before her, that: 
 
[t]he risk of violence towards prostitutes can be reduced, although not necessarily 
eliminated. The two factors that appear to affect the level of violence against 
prostitutes are location or venue of work and individual working conditions. With 
respect to venue, working indoors is generally safer than working on the streets, 
working independently from a fixed location (in-call) appears to be the safest way for 
a prostitute to work in Canada.45 
 
Himel J. also found that: 
 
the impact on a neighbourhood of a prostitute working independently and discreetly 
from a home, or with another person in order to enhance safety may be different than 
the impact of a large ‘brothel-style’ establishment … The evidence from both parties 
demonstrates that there are few community complaints about indoor prostitution 
establishments.46 
 
Councils in New Zealand that have banned brothels from residential areas say that they have 
done so to respond to community concerns.47 These preferences were expressed even though 
there was little evidence in public submissions that brothels operating in residential areas 
before such controls had in fact caused any nuisance problems, or had any actual deleterious 
effect on the properties and communities around them.48 Rather submitters appeared to be 
basing their opposition on moral or religious grounds.49 As the PLRC observed, 
 
SOOBs have caused particular consternation…residents have expressed concerns that 
the suburbs will be inundated with SOOBs, leading to decreased land values/property 
valuations, late night noise, littering and a general lowering of the tone of their 
neighbourhood … [In fact] SOOBs are not a new phenomenon, and have not caused 
widespread problems in the past. Most are so discreet that they go unnoticed. … 
There is little evidence that such activity causes disturbance, other than moral 
indignation, to the community.50 
                                                 
43 PLRC above note 3 at 80; Willowford above note 39, [26]; Conley (H.C). above note 39, [66]–[68]. 
44
 Bedford v. Canada (Attorney General) [2010] O.J. No 4057 per Himel J. [3], Himel J. found that offences set 
out in the Canadian Criminal Code of living on the avails of prostitution, keeping a common bawdy-house and 
communicating in a public place for the purposes of prostitution are not in accord with the principles of 
fundamental justice and breached the right to security of the person protected under the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms. 
45 Ibid. at [300]. 
46 Ibid. at [400]-[401]. 
47 PLRC above note 3 at 138; Conley v. Hamilton City Council [2008] 1 N.Z.L.R. 789; [2008] N.Z.R.M.A. 139 
(C.A.) (hereinafter Conley (C.A.), [34]–[39]; Willowford above note 39 at [55]. 
48 Warnock above note 34. Also see Willowford above note 39 at [75]. 
49 Warnock above note 34. 
50 PLRC above note 3 at 142-3. 
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While van der Meulen and Durisin interpreted the New Zealand reforms as reflecting the 
receptiveness of the general population to the “social legitimating of sex work”,51 this 
evaluation is too optimistic. Local authorities’ restrictions on prostitutes reflect a continuing 
stigmatisation. The fact that local communities appear to be expressing moral indignation to 
prostitution per se rather than providing direct evidence of nuisance effects is particularly 
important as the following part of the article explains.  
 
3. The Misuse of Bylaws and Limited Safeguard of Review 
 
To date, nineteen local authorities have promulgated bylaws to regulate the location of 
brothels.52 Many of these bylaws control brothels, including SOOBs, by excluding them from 
residential areas and allowing them to operate only in commercial or industrial zones. All 
bylaws promulgated by local authorities must conform with the general empowering 
legislation, the Local Government Act 2002, and in accordance with s 145 of that Act can 
only be made to protect the public from nuisance; protect, promote, and maintain public 
health and safety; and / or minimise the potential for offensive behaviour in public places. If 
bylaws are made for reasons that fall outside s145 they will be susceptible to review by the 
High Court.53 Critically, bylaws, including bylaws to regulate brothels, cannot be made 
simply for moral reasons. In JB International v. Auckland City Council, Heath J. confirmed 
that: 
 
Parliament’s intention was that the power to make bylaws regulating the location of 
brothels would be exercised on legal (not moral) grounds with the intention of 
meeting one or more of the policy concerns identified in ss. 145 and 146 of the Local 
Government Act 2002.54 
 
Thus far, bylaws seeking to control prostitution in three of New Zealand’s most heavily 
populated metropolitan cities, Auckland, Christchurch and Hamilton, have been challenged in 
court.55 In each case, the local authority had followed all necessary procedural requirements, 
called for and considered public submissions and produced bylaws that preserved certain 
areas where brothels might operate while excluding them from residential areas.  Opponents 
argued, amongst other things, that the bylaws amounted to a de facto prohibition on SOOBs, 
and challenged them for want of validity56 on the grounds that they interfered unlawfully 
with the rights of prostitutes; were unreasonable; ultra vires of the local authority; or were 
otherwise repugnant to the laws of New Zealand.  
In the first case, Willowford Family Trust v. Christchurch City Council, Panckhurst J. 
considered the local consultation process that had lead to the making of the bylaw and noted 
                                                 
51 Van der Meulen above note 7 at 310. 
52 Warnock above note 34. 
53 The High Court constitutes the second tier of the court system in New Zealand. Appeals from the High Court 
are to the Court of Appeal; appeals from the Court of Appeal are to the highest court, the Supreme Court. 
54
 JB International Ltd v. Auckland City Council [2006] N.Z.R.M.A. 401 (hereinafter JB International) at [92]. 
The Local Government Act 2002 s. 146 lists specific reasons for which bylaws can be made, including ‘(iv) 
trading in public places.’ 
55
 Willowford above note 39; JB International above note 54; Conley (H.C.) above note 39 and Conley (C.A.) 
above note 47. 
56 Bylaws Act 1910 no 28 (Public Act) (NZ) ss. 12, 17. 
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that approximately 1,500 people had made submissions on the issue with 61% taking the 
view that, “brothels should be confined to the central business district.”57 The Council had 
established a sub-committee to advise on the issue. The sub-committee had recommended 
that, “SOOBs should be allowed to operate in residential areas”58 as SOOBs “existed 
presently, largely in residential areas, with few complaints being received … there was little 
evidence that these had caused significant problems.”59 Despite these recommendations, the 
Council promulgated the bylaw that restricted brothels to a limited and defined area in the 
central business district. 
The undesirability of judicial interference with community-based decision-making 
has been considered in all three of the bylaws cases. In Willowford, Panckhurst J. referred to 
McCarthy v. Madden,60 a New Zealand case that sets out, as his Honour described it, the 
“well-established approach to unreasonableness” in bylaws cases.61 McCarthy emphasised 
that Judges “should defer to the assessment of the elected representatives of the community” 
and should be slow to intervene in those decisions, but also stipulated that, “where [a] bylaw 
impinges upon a public right and does not produce a corresponding benefit to the community 
affected by it … generally the bylaw will be unreasonable.”62 Accordingly, an important 
question in Willowford concerned the rights affected by the Christchurch bylaw. The 
applicants argued that the bylaw infringed prostitutes’ right to work and the question arose as 
to whether this was a justiciable right in the present context. New Zealand does have the Bill 
of Rights Act
63
 although this is not supreme law and the identified rights are relatively meagre 
in comparison to those guaranteed by the Canadian Charter.64 While the Bill of Rights Act 
affirms, protects, and promotes certain fundamental freedoms and human rights, including 
the right to freedom of association and the right not to be subjected to degrading or 
disproportionately severe treatment,65 it does not affirm the right to work.66 But Panckhurst J. 
construed the PRA itself as establishing a right for prostitutes to work and also found that the 
PRA recognises SOOBs “as a constituent part of the business of prostitution.”67  
In considering the restrictions imposed by the bylaw, the Judge found that while the 
de jure effect of the bylaw was to restrict all brothels to non-residential areas, its de facto 
effect was to deny the existence of SOOBs in Christchurch.68 The Prostitution Reform Act 
permitted the regulation of brothels but as Municipal Corporation of the City of Toronto v. 
Virgo
69 established, the power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit. In Virgo the 
then Privy Council quashed a bylaw that prevented hawkers from operating in eight of the 
busiest streets of Toronto. The Privy Council considered that rather than looking for a literal 
                                                 
57 Willowford above note 39 at [15]. 
58 Ibid. at [20]. 
59 Ibid. at [75]. 
60 (1914) 33 NZLR 1251. 
61 Willowford above note 39 at [70]. 
62 Ibid. at [67]. 
63 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 no 109 (Public Act) (NZ) (hereinafter NZBRA). Note also LGA s. 
155(3): a bylaw that breaches a right or freedom that has been affirmed in an Act of Parliament will not stand. 
64 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part 1 of the Constitution Act 1982.  
65 NZBRA ss. 17 and 9 respectively. 
66
 All parties accepted that the right to work was an ancient common law right and, if found to be pertinent, 
should be protected by the Court; Willowford above note 39 at [78]-[79]; see for example Ipswich Tailors’ Case 
No 2 (1614) 11 Co.Rep.53a; Nagle v. Feilden [1966] 2 Q.B. 633. 
67
 Willowford above note 39 at [93]. 
68
 Ibid. at [93]-[94]. 
69 [1896] A.C. 88 (P.C.). 
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prohibition, the substantive effect of a bylaw was the important issue.70 Applying Virgo, 
Panckhurst J. framed the ultimate question as to one of substance and degree of interference 
with the right to work and found that the Christchurch bylaw prohibited prostitutes “from 
plying their trade at all in a substantial and important portion of the city no question of any 
apprehended nuisance being raised.”71 In applying McCarthy, Panckhurst J. determined that 
Christchurch City Council could not justify the deleterious effect of the bylaw on prostitutes’ 
rights because there was no corresponding benefit to the community: rather the evidence 
showed that SOOBs existed in residential areas without occasioning “significant problems.”72 
Accordingly, Panckurst J. struck down the bylaw for invalidity. 
In the second case, JB International Ltd v. Auckland City Council, Heath J. also 
quashed the challenged bylaw. Auckland City Council had consulted widely before 
promulgating the bylaw and while the judgement does not refer to the results of this 
consultation, his Honour emphasised on a number of occasions that, “a Council’s bylaw 
making power must be exercised on legal rather than moral grounds.”73 In terms of the 
appropriate legal tests to employ, Heath J. also relied upon McCarthy and the idea that where 
a bylaw affects a public right “it will be scrutinised with greater care.”74 In considering the 
rights established by the PRA, Heath J. disagreed with the Court in Willowford and did not 
accept that the PRA protected the general right of prostitutes to work.75 However, Heath J. 
did find that Parliament intended some brothels would operate from suburban homes. His 
Honour interpreted the PRA as expressly providing for SOOBs and to this extent a 
prohibition of SOOBs would be ultra vires.76 
The Auckland bylaw prevented brothels from operating in residential areas, certain 
other specified precincts and from within certain distances of listed sensitive sites. Heath J. 
found that those wishing to work legally could do so only in “very limited pockets” of 
Auckland city, in areas that “might not be as discreet and safe as potential clients may wish 
them to be.”77 By adopting a Virgo substantive effects test, the Judge found that there was a 
de facto prohibition of SOOBs. Further, Heath J. opined that a likely consequence of 
retaining the bylaw “would be a resurgence in illegal activity outside the designated areas and 
the consequential dilution of the purpose of the Act.”78 
In the third case, Conley v. Hamilton City Council, the bylaw was upheld both at first 
instance in the High Court and on appeal to the Court of Appeal. Both judgments refer to the 
process of community consultation that had taken place. Over 1,350 submissions from the 
public had been received and 77.2% specifically opposed any form of brothel operating in 
residential areas.79 Once again, a sub-committee established by the Council had 
recommended that nevertheless prostitutes be permitted to work from SOOBs in residential 
areas, and once again the Council had promulgated a bylaw that did not accord with this 
                                                 
70
 Schubert v. Wanganui District Council unreported, H.C. Wanganui, CIV 2010-483-230, 3 March 2011 [34]–
[40] and [170] (application of the substantive test in New Zealand). 
71
 Willowford above note 39 at [94]. 
72 Ibid. at [92]. 
73 JB International above note 54 at [102]. 
74 Ibid. at [54] and [55]. 
75 These are afirmed by the NZBRA 1990 s. 9 of the Bill of Rights, JB International above note 54 at [89]. 
76
 JB International above note 54 at [91]–[93]. 
77 Ibid. at [95]. 
78 Ibid. at [95]. 
79 Conley (C.A.) above note 47 at [36]. 
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recommendation in light of public opposition. The Court of Appeal referred to a summary 
that had been prepared of the submissions received that suggested: 
 
small owner operated brothels in residential areas have not always been discreet and 
that there has been a degree of offensive behaviour; residential environments for 
brothels were considered to be more likely to unnecessarily expose children and 
young people to the sex industry; and allowing residential brothels in residential areas 
would add to prostitution becoming “normalised” behaviour within the various 
communities and influence career choices of young people towards work in the sex 
industry.80 
 
The Court of Appeal did not elucidate upon what was meant by “a degree of offensive 
behaviour.” Pursuant to the bylaw, all brothels were confined to industrial and commercial 
zones in Hamilton. In considering the constraints imposed, the Courts accepted that it would 
be “a challenge” to find a house in the permitted area that could be used as a brothel.81 
However, in sharp contrast to the decisions in Willowford and JB International, neither the 
High Court nor the Court of Appeal agreed that this amounted to prohibition under the guise 
of regulation.82 Specifically, the Court of Appeal noted that the bylaw did not “prohibit all 
commercial sexual activity in residential areas.”83 Neither Court in Conley accepted that the 
PRA provided for prostitutes to work in a particular manner. Interestingly, members of the 
New Zealand Prostitutes Collective gave evidence in each bylaws case as to the risks inherent 
with confining brothels to industrial and commercial areas. In Willowford Panckhurst J. 
acknowledged the advantages occasioned by SOOBs although in Conley neither the High 
Court nor Court of Appeal found this evidence persuasive. The Court of Appeal in particular 
refused to find that any justiciable rights had been infringed by the Hamilton bylaw.84 
On the face of the three cases, it is difficult to discern a clear difference in the degrees 
of restriction imposed by the individual bylaws, but the stricter approach taken to the task of 
discerning the effect of the bylaw in Conley is mirrored by the Courts’ approach to judicial 
review and the question of unreasonableness. In so far as the Court of Appeal was concerned, 
unreasonableness in this context should be expressed in terms of the “Wednesbury 
formulation”85 and courts should be very slow to intervene in community-based decision-
making “where as here the choices being made are distinctly ones of social policy”86 in order 
to avoid offending against, 
 
the democratic imperative; (that is, the deciders derive authority from an electoral 
mandate, to which they are accountable); secondly a constitutional imperative, (that 
government, not Courts decides fundamental policy); and thirdly, an imperative that 
                                                 
80 Ibid. at [37]. 
81
 Conley (H.C.) above note 39 at [72]; Conley (C.A.) above note 47 [66]. 
82 Conley (H.C.) ibid. at [76]; Conley (C.A.) ibid. at [66]–[68]. The challenge in Conley failed. Potentially the 
more deferential approach adopted in Conley led the Courts to focus on literal prohibition (the approach taken to 
the degree of scrutiny can influence the decision in error of law cases, see Pearlman v. Keepers and Governors 
of Harrow School [1979] Q.B. 56 (C.A.)). 
83
Conley (C.A.) above note 47 at [67]. 
84 Ibid. at [75]. 
85 Ibid. at [52]. This is of course a reference to Associated Provincial Picture Houses v Wednesbury Corporation 
[1948] 1 KB 223 and its test for unreasonableness: a decision that is so unreasonable that no reasonable 
decision-maker would have come to it. 
86 Ibid. at [75]. 
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Courts in many, if not most areas, lack the relevant expertise to make such 
assessments. 
 
The decision of the Court of Appeal in Conley throws into doubt the approach taken by the 
High Court in Willowford and J.B. International and the result is that the law in this area is in 
a state of flux. However, these cases are interesting as a number of important lessons can be 
learnt from them. 
 First, in at least two of the bylaws cases there was a paucity of evidence to show that 
the bylaws were promulgated for ‘legal not moral’ reasons, and in fact the contrary appears to 
be the case. If this is correct, it is hard to see how the resulting bylaws could fall properly 
within the scope of the empowering legislation, and the actions of the local authorities in 
promulgating those bylaws would be ultra vires. Despite this (and while the Judges were 
willing to sanction against moral-decision making) the courts were unwilling to consider and 
decide the cases on this basis. Why was this? It may have simply been a feature of the 
manner in which the cases were argued, but it might also reflect the nervousness of the 
Judges to consider too closely the decision-making process of communities in such a 
sensitive area. To this extent, judicial review may not provide an adequate safeguard against 
‘moral not legal’ decision-making by local authorities.  
Second, the legislature should be clear that the manner and location of working 
directly affects the well-being and safety of prostitutes and the law should make clear 
provision and support the safest practices, not operate to undermine this. In both Conley and 
Willowford a reverse parody to Virgo existed; despite the bylaws prostitutes could continue to 
ply their trade in residential areas, they could, for example, street-walk. By implication, the 
Court of Appeal found this acceptable but Panckhurst J. did not. Rather Panckhurst J. 
accepted that the manner in which prostitutes chose to operate was an integral component of 
their right to work and his decision in this regard was juxtaposed with findings as to the 
benefits of SOOBs derived from the evidence of the New Zealand Prostitutes Collective. 
Certainly, adopting this approach better upheld the purpose of the PRA by maximising the 
welfare and safety of prostitutes, and it is an approach supported by Virgo. The Privy Council 
did not reason that the disenfranchised hawkers could continue to sell goods in the main city 
by becoming shop-keepers.87 For the Court of Appeal (New Zealand’s second highest court) 
to effectively endorse street-walking but restrict SOOBs is not acceptable in the context of 
the aims of the PRA. And from the perspective of community values, how can this approach 
be preferable?  Clearly, relying upon the evidence in individual cases to demonstrate that 
particular ways of working better promote the well-being and safety of prostitutes, and 
thereafter depending upon judicial discretion to interpret legislation or to approach the review 
in ways that accord with this perspective, is too uncertain a process. 
Third, there has been a real divergence in judicial opinion as to whether the bylaws 
affected rights and therefore what legal tests and intensity of review should apply.88 Both 
Panckhurst J. and Heath J. relied heavily on McCarthy and Virgo, cases that emphasise the 
importance of rights in the evaluation of unreasonableness, supporting the view that where an 
exercise of power intrudes on rights, the courts will more closely scrutinise the resulting 
decision, rule or regulation. Being clear that rights are involved is also more likely persuade 
Judges to rely on a substantive and not a literal interpretation of the effect of the bylaws 
under challenge. The critical issue for the courts in the prostitution cases therefore became 
                                                 
87 We are grateful to Stuart Anderson for this observation. 
88 Dean Knight “The (Continuing) Regulation of Prostitution by Local Authorities” in Abel above note 6 at 148. 
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one of context. Were these cases to be properly categorised as rights-based cases: did the 
bylaws infringe rights? The Court of Appeal did not believe so and as a result found that 
Wednesbury provided the correct standard for review. Clearly, the application of this test 
(which holds that “only a very extreme degree [of unreasonableness] can bring an 
administrative decision within the legitimate scope of judicial invalidation”89) to bylaws 
created in accordance with a legislative regime that provides for extensive public 
participation creates an intractable difficulty for opponents. If the majority of submitters 
supported the bylaw, challenges based on unreasonableness, absent more explicit vires 
arguments, will fail. And if a large number of authorities had promulgated similar bylaws, the 
position of the minority dissenters appears hopeless. By definition, minorities will not be 
favoured by Wednesbury. 
Although parliamentarians were clear as to the rights that prostitutes should have, the 
diverse views of the courts demonstrate that this clarity has not been sufficiently reflected in 
the text of the PRA. Further, in light of New Zealand’s skeletal domestic human rights 
legislation, the rights anticipated by supporters are not rights that are clearly justiciable.90 It is 
possible that the confusion that has arisen in New Zealand over the relevance and content of 
applicable rights is less likely to arise in Canada. There, the Constitution expressly includes 
potentially relevant rights, which case law has applied in the actual context of prostitution.91 
But, this aside, legislation that seeks to effect radical change in the way that society perceives 
and treats hitherto maligned minorities should be explicit in the rights afforded to those 
minorities, particularly if these are not guaranteed by the Constitution or otherwise well 
articulated in general law.  
In summary, the bylaws cases have lead to inconsistency and confusion. The hope 
that the reforms would give prostitutes “justice, safety, and dignity” is yet to be realised and 
the bar to achieving this is propped up not just by the misuse of bylaws and the limited 
safeguard of review but also by mechanisms available to local authorities in their town and 
country-planning role.  
 
 
4. Counterproductive Tinkering: The Regulation of Prostitution by Resource Management 
Mechanisms 
 
In addition to using bylaws, local authorities can regulate brothels via planning law 
mechanisms and were able to do so without any additional powers being granted to them by 
the PRA. Prior to the advent of the PRA, the courts in planning cases had long acknowledged 
“that, planning must allow a diversity in social behaviour … [it] gives the members of the 
community the opportunity to adopt the lifestyle they desire, notwithstanding that it may be a 
lifestyle foreign to or even criticised by others” and that planning may restrict that behaviour 
“only when necessary for the common good.”92 What exactly constitutes the common good 
                                                 
89 R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Dept ex p. Daly [2001] 2 A.C .532; [2001] 3 All E.R. 433 (H.L.), per 
Lord Cooke at [32]. 
90 Neither NZBRA nor the Human Rights Act 1993 no 82 (Public Act) (N.Z.) include the right to security of the 
person that was the Canadian Charter right held to be unjustifiably breached in Bedford above note 44, or rights 
to free choice of work/to just and favourable work conditions. 
91 Bedford above note 44. 
92
 Centrepoint Community Growth Trust v. Takapuna City Council (1978) 6 N.Z.T.P.A. 503 (P.T.) (Turner J.) 
507. 
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was given greater definition following the promulgation of the Resource Management Act in 
1991 (‘RMA’).93 
Described as effects-based legislation,94 the RMA draws a clear distinction between 
activities and the effects on the environment of those activities. In contrast to the centralised 
planning approach popular under the Town and Country Planning Acts, the introduction of 
the RMA signalled a more liberal approach to land use; people should be permitted to do 
what they want with their land providing that this does not result in undue adverse effects on 
the environment.95 Time and again the courts have emphasised that, “it is effects on the 
environment that ultimately are of importance, rather than the precise identity of the activity 
generating them.”96Accordingly, in making rules to regulate land use97 or in determining 
resource consent applications for permission to do something contrary to the provisions of a 
plan,98 local authorities are to focus upon environmental effects not the nature of activities 
per se. 
The underlying effects-based philosophy of the RMA has a particular relevance when 
one is concerned with prostitution. Theoretically, the nature of the business of prostitution, 
that is, the activity itself, conducted in private away from prying eyes, should be irrelevant in 
resource management decision-making. Only the external nuisance effects flowing from that 
activity should be considered by decision-makers, as this is the case with all other types of 
activity that come under legal scrutiny.  
As stated above, studies conducted prior to and post the enactment of the PRA found 
that nuisance effects from brothels, particularly SOOBs, were rare.99 Despite this, prostitution 
related activities are heavily regulated in district plans that specifically address the issue100 
and the reason for this lies in the difficulties of drafting effects-based plans. The majority of 
authorities still use a traditional zoning approach to drafting plans that identifies specific 
activities that will be permitted, controlled or prohibited within individual zones (an approach 
that is based on the presumption that particular activities tend to generate standard 
environmental effects) and call for public submissions on these proposals. Local authorities 
justify this approach to drafting on the basis that it facilitates lay peoples’ understanding of 
plans and whilst not expressly endorsed by the courts, it is not a practice that has been 
                                                 
93 The RMA prescribes an interrelated system of planning documents and procedures to regulate the use of land, 
air and water.  
94
 Application by Christchurch City Council [1995] N.Z.R.M.A. 129 (H.C.). 
95 RMA s. 9; Batchelor v. Tauranga District Council (No. 2) [1993] 2 N.Z.L.R. 84 (H.C.) 139. 
96
Batchelor above note 95 at 142; KB Furniture v. Tauranga District Council [1993] 3 N.Z.L.R. 197, 201; 
Kamo Veterinary Holdings Ltd v. Whangarei District Council unreported, Envt. C. Auckland, A161/2003, 18 
September 2003 [28]. Such effects are not to be considered in a vacuum but rather help determine how best to 
promote the purpose of the Act: “that is the sustainable management of natural and physical resources.”  
Sustainable management includes “… managing the use, development, and protection of natural and physical 
resources in a way, or at a rate, which enable people and communities to provide for their social, economic, and 
cultural well-being and safety ...” see RMA Part 2 ss. 5-8. So, in considering both the positive and adverse 
effects flowing from a proposed activity, the local authority in the first instance, or the Environment Court on a 
de novo appeal, would make a final determination on the application in accordance with what best met the 
purpose of the Act. 
97 RMA s. 76(3). 
98 RMA s. 104(1), when considering an application for a resource consent decision-makers must, “subject to 
Part 2, have regard to (a) any actual or potential effects on the environment of allowing the activity; and (b) any 
relevant provisions of… a plan; and (c) any other matter the consent authority considers is reasonably necessary 
to determine the application.” 
99 Above notes 48 and 50 above and accompanying text. 
100 Warnock above note 34. 
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criticised.101 In amending plans to address prostitution, authorities have specifically identified 
‘brothels’, not the neutralised effects of such.102 This wording tends to invite a moral 
response from submitters103 and indeed a survey of the submissions received supports this 
contention.104 Communities are not accepting of prostitution despite decriminalisation105and 
the discussion at local authority level has provided a clear demonstration of this; local 
authority planning regulation is not focused upon ensuring equity for prostitutes, far from it.  
In particular, as stated above, communities have been most resistant to prostitutes operating 
from residential areas. While, as noted by van der Meulen and Durisin, the PRA appears to 
empower small groups of sex workers from working from home,106in practice this has not 
proved to be the case. 
Plan rules may therefore present hurdles to prostitutes who wish to establish SOOBs, 
however there are mechanisms that provide checks and balances against unduly restrictive 
plans. Prostitutes who want to work from their home in residential areas could challenge the 
plan107 or, more appropriately, apply for a resource consent108 granting dispensation from the 
plan rules (a cheaper, speedier remedy). Again, a critical component concerns the notification 
of any such applications and public participation in decision-making.109 However, applicants 
face an onerous obstacle to consent. Section 15 of the PRA amended the RMA by requiring 
decision-makers to take into account community moral concerns, even in the absence of 
specific nuisance effects,110 and a valid interpretation of the legislation is that such concerns 
are to be given particular priority.111 
Decision-makers are not expressly mandated to take into account moral mores in 
considering any other business-related application for resource consent (for example, 
‘pornography retailers’, ‘alternative religious organisations’ or ‘vivisection laboratories’) and 
while psychological effects may constitute valid planning concerns in certain instances, the 
practice of the courts has been to give little if any weight to moral considerations, or to the 
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 Christchurch above note 94 and see Warnock above note 34. 
102 For example, Waimate District Plan bans the ‘business of prostitution’ from the residential zone and Lower 
Hutt City Plan regulates the location of ‘brothels’ see Warnock above note 34. 
103 Text accompanying notes 47 - 50 above. Public submissions are not wholly determinative of an issue, as the 
authority has to undertake a comprehensive analysis, RMA s. 32, however in the context of activities that are 
perceived to have a high social impact, it appears that submissions will carry great weight. 
104 Warnock above note 34. In the Australian context, a similar phenomenon has occurred, see P. Crofts 
“Brothels and Disorderly Acts” (2007) 1 Public Space: the Journal of Law and Social Justice, at 21-28. 
105 Further see “NZ’ers Want Brothels Booted Out of Residential Areas,” 30th May 2011 online: Scoop, < 
http://auckland.scoop.co.nz/2011/05/nzers-want-brothels-booted-out-of-residential-areas-2/> (date accessed 31 
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106 Van der Meulen above note 7 at 308. 
107 RMA Schedule 1 Part 2. 
108 RMA s. 9; even in the absence of express controls, businesses will have to comply with generic rules as to 
opening-hours, traffic controls etc. or apply for resource consent. 
109 Above note 32. 
110 General adverse effects (noise, traffic etc.) are possible with all businesses and can be managed by conditions 
on the consent or an early review of the consent. Effects on property prices constitute valid planning concerns 
but strong evidence must be adduced of significant effects and the court has warned that, “… real estate agents’ 
assessments are notoriously variable…market conditions at the time of sale are unpredictable, but much more 
likely to be the predominant influence” (Little Sydney Mining Co. v. Tasman District Council unreported, Envt . 
C. Wellington, W150/09, 1 September 2010 at [93]). 
111 These effects have been singled out; decision-makers ‘must have regard’ to them; they are not muted by 
being ‘subject to’ the considerations contained in Part 2 of the RMA as all other effects are. 
 16
psychological effects of ‘mere knowledge’, when they have been raised.112Rather, the courts 
had developed objective tests and standards that reflected the idea that mere discomfort or the 
thought that ‘you don’t like what that other person is doing,’ is an insufficient basis for 
preventing a person using their property in an otherwise legal manner.  
Section 15 of the PRA has changed this approach. The section has only been subject 
to judicial interpretation on one occasion so far but the decision of the High Court in Mount 
Victoria Residents Association Inc v. Wellington City Council
113
 confirms that the 
ramifications of the amendment are considerable. That case concerned a preliminary decision 
on a resource consent application (akin to planning permission) for a brothel. Wellington City 
Council argued that it should not have to consider a brothel any differently to any other 
business seeking resource consent. In particular, the understanding of the Council was that 
the PRA did not give local authorities the ability to decline applications for brothels solely on 
the nature of the activity taking-place on the site.114 Dobson J. disagreed and stated that: 
 
[t]he prospect of serious offence being given to ordinary members of the public using 
the area, or indeed the incompatibility of the business of prostitution with the existing 
character of an area, as recognised by s 15(1) of the PRA, does mean that a territorial 
authority might decline an application for a business of prostitution solely on the 
character of the activity that was to take place on the site.115 
 
In the context of resource management law the statement that a territorial authority 
might decline an application for a business “solely on the character of the activity” is entirely 
novel. If this is correct, s. 15 has two major effects.  Firstly, it permits decision-making that is 
contrary to the philosophy underpinning environmental management in New Zealand and 
secondly, it radically alters the basis for decision-making where prostitution based activities 
are concerned compared to any other commercial activity. Planning law imposes all sorts of 
restrictions on businesses to manage nuisance effects, but it is only prostitution related 
activities that may legally be restricted on the sole basis that ‘others don’t like the thought of 
what is taking place in private.’ There is no attempt to explain the meaning of “serious 
offence” in the PRA but the courts may well draw on formula established in other areas to 
guide interpretation. Within the criminal sphere in Australasia, case law has established that, 
‘offensive behaviour’ must “wound the feelings, arouse anger or resentment or disgust or 
outrage” even if that result was unintentional.116 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, to date there have not been any substantive court decisions on 
resource consent applications for prostitution-based activities. Throughout the whole of New 
Zealand, only three applications for resource consent have been received since the enactment 
of the PRA.117 Two concerned applications for brothels in residential areas and both 
applications were withdrawn when the applicants were informed (post Mount Victoria) that 
full notification would be required.  The Council administrative fee for full public 
notification would cost at least NZD$12,000 in these cases (c. CAD$9,500).  
                                                 
112 See Ceri Warnock, “Understanding the Objective: Psychological Effects in Environmental Decision-
Making” (2011) 25 New Zealand Universities Law Review, (forthcoming). 
113 Unreported, H.C. Wellington, CIV-2008-485-1820, 5 March 2009 (Dobson J.). 
114 Ibid. at [31]. 
115 Ibid. at [32]. 
116
 Ceramalus v. Police (1991) 7 C.R.N.Z. 678, 683. 
117 Warnock above note 34. 
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Members of the New Zealand Prostitutes Collective have expressed concerns that 
local authority regulation appears to be undermining the purpose of the PRA and their 
national co-ordinator has stated that: 
 
[a] number of sex workers are forced to work in breach of these bylaws and district 
plans which is a significant issue for those sex workers who wish to determine their 
own sex work. It frustrates NZPC that these Councils are misinterpreting the purpose 
of the PRA and undermining the rights, health, and wellbeing of these independent 
sex workers in particular. You would expect policies to support sex workers to be 
self-determining.118  
 
The suggestion is therefore that a clandestine, illegitimate brothel industry is developing, 
which is of course completely counter-productive to the law reform of decriminalisation. 
In summary, s. 15 of the PRA introduces higher hurdles for prostitutes in obtaining 
resource consent for businesses in comparison to all other applicants. It enables, as Dobson J. 
stated, resource consent to be declined because of the very nature of the business. The 
participation of the public, taken in conjunction with the method of plan making, allows the 
moral disapproval of the community to dominate and s. 15 of the PRA has over ridden the 
case law that, arguably, would have achieved a better balance in managing the inherent 
conflict of interests that accompanies prostitution. Thus, within the context of planning law, 





Over sixty years ago, the Wolfenden Report on Homosexual Offences and Prostitution 
concluded that “… unless a deliberate attempt is to be made by a society, acting through the 
agency of the law, to equate the sphere of crime with that of sin, there must remain a realm of 
private morality and immorality which is, in brief and crude terms, not the law’s 
business.”119Undoubtedly a sexual minority, prostitutes have been left behind in the progress 
towards equality achieved by similarly stigmatised minorities, perhaps a reflection that they 
are truly a most disadvantaged group. Thus, in disentangling the ‘sin’ of prostitution from the 
sphere of crime, New Zealand seemingly made monumental strides forward in human rights 
terms. But the legislature faltered and failed at the last moment. No longer criminalised, 
prostitution is nevertheless still controlled and restricted in accordance with moral mores, and 
the continued legal discrimination of prostitutes is justified by the same moral disapproval 
that underpinned criminal sanctions. By those most uninteresting of legal mechanisms, 
bylaws and district plans, many prostitutes in New Zealand will be prevented from achieving 
the right to ‘justice, safety and dignity’ envisaged by supporters of the PRA. 
These local government mechanisms, legitimised by public participatory structures, 
have permitted the moral disapprobation of communities to the ‘self regarding conduct of 
others’ to take precedence. The result, legally, has been the heavy regulation of prostitution; 
regulation that particularly affects prostitutes wanting to work safely indoors by themselves 
or in small collectives. And what has been the practical result of this? In a scenario almost 
                                                 
118 Catherine Healy personal communication with authors 11th October 2011(on file). 
119 Committee on Homosexual Offences and Prostitution, Report of the Committee on Homosexual Offences and 
Prostitution (Cm. 247, 1957) at 187–188. 
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redolent of the imaginings of Huxley, those sex workers wishing to escape the corporatisation 
of commercial sex, or the squalor of street walking, will have increasingly limited choices.  
Within New Zealand, a legal fix to this problem is simple: repeal sections 14 and 15 
of the PRA. Trust in the checks and safeguards of resource management law to strike the 
correct balance between reflecting community interests and ensuring against undue 
discrimination of a disadvantaged and maligned minority. Whilst genuine nuisance effects 
should be managed, mere moral disapprobation (or the thought that opponents ‘do not like 
what others are doing, consensually, in private’) should have no place in regulating 
prostitution as a decriminalised activity. Although Parliamentary caution was understandable 
at the beginning, almost a decade has passed since the reforms were enacted and it is time to 
move forward. The report of the PLRC may assuage many of the initial concerns expressed 
over decriminalisation and the focus must now move towards ensuring the rights-based 
purposes of the PRA.  
For other similar nations, particularly Canada, the message is clear. Reforming 
archaic criminal laws on prostitution is unlikely to lead to the Sodom and Gomorrah feared 
and will improve the position of prostitutes immeasurably, but even in a liberal society such 
as New Zealand, communities are still resistant to the idea that prostitutes deserve fair 
treatment. Law-makers should be clear that in the context of prostitution the manner of 
working is important and any rights-based law should support the safest practices, not act to 
prevent this. Ultimately, there is little point in recasting the issue as one of human rights if 
moral majoritarianism is allowed to re-enter through the back door.  To pass decision-making 
to local authorities at an early stage in the reform process may allow the moral mores of the 
community to dominate in an area rife with emotions and this has the potential to act as 
anathema to rights-based legislation. 
 
